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1 Introduction
If macroeconomic policies had lowered European unemployment in the 1980s, what
would have been the inflation costs? Under the standard view of the long-run
unemployment-inflation relationship, this is not an interesting question. The stan-
dard view is that there is a value of the unemployment rate (the NAIRU) below which
the price level accelerates and above which the price level decelerates. This view is
echoed, for example, in Unemployment: Choices for Europe, where Alogoskoufis et
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715,
Fax: 203-432-6167, e-mail: fair@econ.yale.edu; website: http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. All the
data used in this paper can be downloaded from the website. Also, the experiment performed in
this paper can be duplicated on the website.al. (1995, p. 124) state “We would not want to dissent from the view that there is no
long-run trade-off between activity and inflation, so that macroeconomic policies by
themselves can do little to secure a lasting reduction in unemployment.” Under the
standard view it is not sensible to talk about long-run trade-offs between unemploy-
ment and inflation.
The results in Fair (1997a, 1997b), however, which are based on estimating price
and wage equations for 28 countries, including 15 European countries, do not sup-
port the NAIRU model. They overwhelmingly reject the dynamics implied by the
model. The results support the “level” form of the price and wage equations, where a
permanent change in the unemployment rate has a long-run effect on the price level
but not on the inflation rate (and not a fortiori on the change in the inflation rate). If
these results are correct, they change the way one thinks about the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation, and they make the question about macro policies and
European unemployment an interesting one.
This paper uses the multicountry econometric (MC) model in Fair (1994), in-
cluding the price and wage equations mentioned above, to estimate what would have
happened to European unemployment and inflation in the 1982:1–1990:4 period had
theBundesbankfollowedaneasiermonetarypolicythanitinfactdid. TheMCmodel
isoutlinedinSection2, andthepriceandwageequationsarepresentedanddiscussed
in Section 3. The results of the experiment are then reported in Section 4.
If the NAIRU model is rejected, the new story about the price level and unem-
ployment does not have to imply that unemployment can be driven close to zero with
only a modest long-run effect on the price level. There may be (and seems likely to
2be) a nonlinear relationship between the price level and unemployment at low values
of unemployment, where pushing unemployment further and further below some low
value results in larger and larger increases in the price level. This nonlinearity would
in effect bound unemployment above a certain value. It will be seen in Section 3 that
this nonlinearity is hard to estimate because there are not enough observations at low
unemployment rates to provide good estimates. This paucity of observations argues
against using estimated price and wage equations to predict what prices and wages
would be at unemployment rates much lower than those that existed historically. For-
tunately, this is not a problem for the present paper because the period considered
here is one characterized by high unemployment rates. More will be said about this
in the Conclusion.
2 The MC Model
There are 33 countries in the MC model.1There are 31 stochastic equations for the
UnitedStatesandupto15eachfortheothercountries. Thetotalnumberofstochastic
equations is 328, and the total number of estimated coefficients is 1442. In addition,
there are 1041 estimated trade-share equations. The total number of endogenous and
exogenous variables, not counting the trade shares, is about 4000. Trade-share data
were collected for 45 countries, and so the trade-share matrix is 4545.2An updated
1The 33 countries are the United States, Canada, Japan, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, South Africa, Korea, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Colombia, Jordan, Syria, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
2The 12 other countries that fill out the trade-share matrix are Nigeria, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Bangladesh, Singapore, and an all other
category.
3versionofthismodelhasbeenusedforthepresentwork, andthisversionispresented
on the website mentioned in the introductory footnote.
The estimation periods begin in 1954:1 for the United States and as soon after
1960 as data permit for the other countries. They end between 1992 and 1994 except
for the United States, where they end in 1997:1. The estimation technique is 2SLS
except when there are too few observations to make the technique practical, where
OLS is used. The estimation accounts for possible serial correlation of the error
terms. The variables used for the first stage regressors for a country are the main
predetermined variables in the model for the country. A list of these variables is
available from the website.3
On the demand side, there are estimated equations for consumption, fixed invest-
ment, inventory investment, and imports for each country. Consumption depends on
income, wealth, and an interest rate. Fixed investment depends on output and an
interest rate. Inventory investment depends on the level of sales and the lagged stock
of inventories. The level of imports depends on income, wealth, the relative price
of imported versus domestically produced goods, and an interest rate. The interest
rate used for a given country and equation is either a short-term rate or a long-term
rate, depending on which was more significant. The long-term rate is related to the
short-term rate in each country through a standard term structure equation, where
the long-term rate depends on the current value and lagged values of the short-term
rate. A decrease in the short-term interest rate in a country leads to a decrease in
3All the variables and equations in the model are presented in Appendices A and B of The
MC Model Workbook on the website. All the coefficient estimates are presented in the “Chapter 5
Tables” and “Chapter 6 Tables” that follow the appendices. Various test results for each equation
are presented along with the coefficient estimates.
4the long-term rate, and interest-rate decreases have a positive effect on consumption,
fixed investment, and imports.
There are estimated price and wage equations per country. The domestic price
levelinacountrydepends,amongotherthings,onameasureofdemandpressure(usu-
ally an output-gap variable) and the price of imports. These equations are presented
in Section 3.
There is an estimated interest-rate reaction function for each country. The short-
terminterestratedependsoninflation,demandpressure,andthebalanceofpayments.
These are “leaning against the wind” equations of the monetary authorities. The
monetary authorities are estimated to raise short-term interest rates in response to
increases in inflation and demand pressure and decreases in the balance of payments.
The U.S. short-term interest rate is an explanatory variable in a number of the other
countries’ reaction functions. This means that the United States is assumed to play
a leadership role in setting monetary policy. Also, the German short-term interest
rate is an explanatory variable in a number of the other European countries’ reaction
functions.
There is an estimated exchange rate equation per country. For Germany and all
the non-European countries, the dependent variable is the exchange rate vis-à-vis the
U.S. dollar. For these countries, the exchange rate depends on the price level of the
country relative to the U.S. price level and the short-term interest rate of the country
relative to the U.S. interest rate. For the European countries except Germany, the
dependent variable is the exchange rate vis-à-vis the mark. For these countries the
exchange rate depends on the price level of the country relative to the German price
5level and the short-term interest rate of the country relative to the German interest
rate.
There are also estimated equations explaining employment, the labor force of
men, and the labor force of women per country. Employment depends on output and
the amount of excess labor on hand. Labor force participation depends on the real
wage and a labor market tightness variable designed to pick up discouraged worker
effects.
In a given trade-share equation, the share of country i’s total imports imported
from country j depends on the price of country j’s exports relative to a price index of
all the other countries’ export prices. The trade-share equations are in U.S. dollars,
and all export prices are converted to dollar prices using the exchange rates. The
restriction that the sum of all exports equals the sum of all imports is imposed in the
model.
There is a mixture of quarterly and annual data in the MC model. Quarterly
equations are estimated for 14 countries (the first 14 in footnote 1), and annual equa-
tions are estimated for the remaining 19. However, all the trade-share equations are
quarterly. There are quarterly data on all the variables that feed into the trade-share
equations, namely the exchange rate, the local-currency price of exports, and the
total value of imports per country. When the model is solved, the predicted annual
values of these variables for the annual countries are converted to predicted quarterly
values using a simple distribution assumption. The quarterly predicted values from
the trade-share equations are converted to annual values by summation or averaging
when this is needed.
63 The Price and Wage Equations
Empirical Specification
Thetheorythathasguidedthespecificationofthepriceandwageequationsinthissec-
tion was first presented in Fair (1974), and more recent discussions are in Fair (1984,
Chapter 3), Fair (1994, Chapter 2), and Fair (1997a). The empirical specification of
the price and wage equations is as follows:
pt D 0 C 1pt−1 C 2.wt − t/ C 3st C 4Dt C 5t C t (1)
wt − t D γ0 C γ1.wt−1 − t−1/ C γ2pt C γ3pt−1 C γ4Dt C γ5t C t (2)
p is the log of the price level, and w is the log of the wage rate. s is the log of the
import price level minus p lagged once; it is a measure of relative import prices. D is
some measure of demand pressure—the choices tried for D are discussed below.  is
the log of 3, where 3 is an estimate of the potential level of output per worker. In the
empiricalwork3isestimatedfrompeak-to-peakinterpolationsofoutputperworker.
The growth rate of 3 is an estimate of the growth rate of potential productivity. The
change in w −  is the growth rate of the nominal wage rate less the growth rate of
potential productivity.  and  are error terms.
The lagged price variable in equation (1) can be thought of as picking up expec-
tational effects, the wage variable and the relative import price variable as picking up
cost effects, and the demand variable as picking up demand effects. All these effects
are in the theoretical specification mentioned above.
The time trend in equation (1) is meant to pick up any trend effects on the price
level not captured by the other variables. Adding the time trend to an equation like
7(1) is similar to adding the constant term to an equation specified in terms of changes
rather than levels. The time trend will also pick up any trend mistakes made in
constructing t. If, for example, t D a
t C t, where a
t is the correct variable to
subtract from wt to adjust for potential productivity, then the time trend will absorb
this error.
In the wage equation, equation (2), the wage rate is a function of the lagged wage
rate, the current and lagged price level, the demand variable, and the time trend.
It is an equation in which the wage rate adjusts to the price level over time. The
price equation is identified because of the inclusion of the lagged wage in the wage
equation, and the wage equation is identified because of the inclusion of the relative
import price variable in the price equation.
When price and wage equations are specified, one has to be careful regarding
what they imply about the determination of the real wage, which is wt − t − pt in
the present notation. Solving equations (1) and (2) for wt − t − pt yields:
wt − t − pt D 1
1−2γ2f.1 − 2/γ1.wt−1 − t−1/ C [.1 − 2/γ3 − .1 − γ2/1]pt−1
−.1 − γ2/0 C .1 − 2/γ0 − .1 − γ2/3st
−[.1 − γ2/4Dt C .1 − 2/γ4] − [−.1 − γ2/5 C .1 − 2/γ5]t
−.1 − γ2/t C .1 − 2/tg
(3)
Unless the coefficient of wt−1 − t−1 equals the negative of the coefficient of pt−1,
equation (3) implies that in the long run the real wage depends on the level of p,
which is not sensible. Consequently, the restriction that the two coefficients are equal
in absolute value and of opposite signs is imposed in the estimation. The restriction




.1 − γ2/ − γ1 (4)
The Demand Pressure Variable, D
An attempt was made in the estimation of the price and wage equations to account for
a possible nonlinear relationship between pt and the unemployment rate at low levels
of the unemployment rate. Two functional forms were tried for the unemployment
rate. In addition, two other activity variables, both measures of the output gap, were
tried in place of the unemployment rate, and two functional forms were tried for each
gap variable.
Let ut denote the unemployment rate, and let u0
t D ut − umin, where umin is the
minimum value of the unemployment rate in the sample period (t D 1;:::;T). The
first form tried was linear, namely Dt D u0
t. The other was Dt D 1=.u0
t C :02/.F o r
the second form Dt is infinity when u0
t equals −:02, and so this form says that as
the unemployment rate approaches 2.0 percentage point below the smallest value it
reached in the sample period, the price level approachesinfinity.4
For the first output-gap variable, a potential output series, denoted Y
t , was con-
structed from peak-to-peak interpolations of the level of output per worker and the
number of workers per working-age population. (The peak-to-peak interpolation
4In earlier work values other than .02 were tried for Dt, including .005, .01, .015, and .05. The
value that resulted in the best fit for a country tended to be around .02, and so for present purposes
the formal searching was done using only .02 and the linear form. As discussed below, the fits tend
to be similar across functional forms, and the data do not discriminate well among different forms,
including the linear form.
9of output per worker is 3t mentioned above.) Define the gap, denoted Gt,a s
.Y
t − Yt/=Y
t , where Yt is the actual level of output, and let G0
t D Gt − Gmin,
where Gmin is the minimum value of Gt in the sample period. For this variable the
first form was linear, and the other was Dt D 1=.G0
t C :02/.
For the second output-gap variable, a potential output series was constructed by
regressing, over the sample period, logYt on a constant and t. The gap Gt is then
defined to be d logYt - logYt, where d logYt is the predicted value from the regression.
The rest of the treatment is the same as for the first output-gap variable.
Two functional forms for the unemployment rate and two each for the output-gap
variables yields 6 different variables to try. In addition, each variable was tried both
unlaggedandlaggedonceseparately,giving12differentvariables. Thesearchingwas
doneusingequation(1)undertheassumptionofafirstorderautoregressiveerrorterm
and with three variables added. The three added variables are pt−2, wt−1 −t−1, and
st−1. The demand pressure variable chosen was the one with the highest t-statistic.
Nodemandpressurevariablewaschosenifthecoefficientestimatesofallthedemand
pressure variables were of the wrong sign.
Once the demand pressure variable was chosen, three further specification deci-
sions were made. The first is whether wt − t or wt−1 − t−1 should be included
in the final specification, the second is whether st or st−1 should be included, and
the third is whether the autoregressive assumption about the error term should be
retained. Foreachofthefirsttwodecisionsthevariablewiththehighert-statisticwas
chosen provided its coefficient estimate was of the expected sign, and for the third
decision the autoregressive assumption was retained if the autoregressive coefficient
10estimatewassignificantatthefivepercentlevel. Ifwhentriedseparatelybothwt −t
and wt−1 − t−1 had coefficient estimates of the wrong sign, neither was used, and
similarly for st and st−1.5
The same searching for the best demand pressure variable was done for the wage
equation (2) as was done for the price equation. This searching was done without
imposing the coefficient restriction in (4) and under the assumption of a first order
autoregressiveerrorterm. Oncethedemandpressurevariablewaschosen,onefurther
specification decision had to be made for the wage equation, namely whether the
autoregressive assumption of the error term should be retained. The same decision
criterion was used here as was used for the price equation.
The Estimates
Theestimationtechniquewas2SLSforthequarterlycountriesandOLSfortheannual
countries. For 2SLS, the endogenous variables were taken to be pt, wt, Dt, and st.
The quality of the data varies across countries, and the results for the individual
countries should not necessarily be weighted equally. In particular, the results for the
countries with only annual data should probably be weighted less. Also, the wage
data are probably not in general as good as the price data. The reason there are
fewer countries with estimated wage equations than estimated price equations below
is simply because of data limitations.
Four dummy variables were used for Germany for all its estimated equations in
5When wt−1 − t−1 is chosen, the coefficient restriction in (4) becomes γ3 D .1 C 2/.1 −
γ2/ − γ1.
11an attempt to account for the effects of the reunification of the country. The first had
a value of one in 1990:3 and zero otherwise; the second a value of one in 1990:4 and
zero otherwise; the third a value of one in 1991:1 and zero otherwise; and the fourth
a value of one in 1991:2 and zero otherwise. To save space, the coefficient estimates
for the dummy variables have not been reported in the tables below.
The estimates of the final specification of the price equation are presented in
Table 1.6 The table shows that of the 18 countries for which a demand pressure
variable was used,7 the functional form was linear for 10 of them. The chosen
variable was the unemployment rate for 4 of them, the first output-gap variable for
8 of them, and the second output-gap variable for the remaining 6. There is thus no
strong pattern here, although a slight edge for the linear form and the first output-gap
variable. The good showing for the linear form shows the difficulty of estimating
the point at which the relationship between the price level and demand becomes
nonlinear. Also, although not shown in Table 1, the fits of the equations tended not to
be very sensitive to the use of alternative functional forms, such as those mentioned
in footnote 4, and no clear winner emerged.
Of the 9 countries with no demand pressure variable in Table 1, two of them—the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom—have wage equations with demand pressure
variables. For these two countries demand pressure affects prices by affecting wages,
which affect prices. South Africa is the only quarterly country for which there are no
demand pressure effects on the price level.
6The estimates of the price and wage equations for the United States not presented in this paper.
See Fair (1997a) for a detailed discussion of the U.S. equations.
7Remember, no demand pressure variable was included if the coefficient estimates of all the
demand pressure variables were of the wrong sign.
12Table 1
Estimates of the Price Equation
pt D 0 C 1pt−1 C 2.wt − t/ C 3st C 4Dt C 5t
Best
D O 0 O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O  SE DW Sample
Quarterly
CA G2−1(lin) -0.070 0.947 0.012 0.021 a-0.13469 0.00047 0.499 0.0053 2.25 1966.1-1996.1
(-0.67) ( 17.53) ( 0.25) ( 1.44) (-5.16) ( 1.99) ( 5.43)
JA G2(lin) -0.765 0.742 0.139 0.028 -0.24050 0.00152 0.688 0.0074 2.15 1967.3-1995.4
(-3.09) ( 10.23) ( 2.73) ( 2.06) (-3.36) ( 3.07) ( 7.06)
AU G1(.02) -0.734 0.840 a 0.095 a0.041 0.00023 0.00086 -0.397 0.0104 1.99 1971.1-1994.1
(-2.40) ( 13.00) ( 2.13) ( 2.57) (1.04) ( 2.26) (-3.64)
FR U−1(lin) -0.742 0.848 0.099 a0.019 a-0.06777 0.00050 0.291 0.0047 1.79 1976.1-1995.2
(-2.74) ( 18.14) ( 2.76) ( 1.35) (-0.66) ( 2.14) ( 2.41)
GE G2−1(lin) -0.469 0.877 a0.047 0.018 a-0.07823 0.00053 b 0.0031 1.88 1969.1-1994.4
(-6.26) ( 57.14) ( 5.51) ( 4.65) (-4.91) ( 5.05)
IT G2(lin) -0.157 0.941 0.018 0.042 -0.17374 0.00114 b 0.0069 1.69 1971.1-1995.3
(-2.01) ( 29.46) ( 0.64) ( 6.23) (-5.62) ( 4.97)
NE none -0.730 0.714 a0.130 0.075 − 0.00091 b 0.0080 1.57 1978.2-1995.4
(-1.77) ( 9.30) ( 1.30) ( 4.53) ( 2.05)
ST G1−1(lin) 0.002 0.979 c a0.015 a-0.13828 0.00016 0.575 0.0031 1.64 1971.1-1994.4
( 0.04) ( 27.67) ( 1.36) (-4.42) ( 0.42) ( 5.78)
UK none -0.398 0.856 0.164 0.064 − -0.00045 b 0.0108 0.99 1966.1-1995.2
(-4.06) ( 23.78) ( 3.75) ( 7.35) (-1.63)
FI U(.02) -0.157 0.879 a0.090 0.028 0.00057 0.00061 b 0.0076 1.92 1976.1-1993.3
(-1.92) ( 12.01) ( 1.12) ( 2.47) ( 3.78) ( 1.41)
AS G1−1(.02) 0.055 1.001 c 0.020 a0.00039 -0.00036 b 0.0105 2.06 1971.1-1995.4
( 1.52) ( 79.51) ( 1.54) ( 3.08) (-1.56)
SO none -0.127 0.970 c 0.034 − 0.00099 b 0.0176 2.18 1962.1-1995.3
(-3.31) (116.75) ( 3.03) ( 4.09)
KO G2−1(.02) -0.665 0.696 0.329 0.100 a0.00107 -0.00548 -0.256 0.0367 1.87 1964.1-1995.4
(-3.42) ( 8.65) ( 3.80) ( 3.07) ( 1.58) (-3.76) (-2.36)
13Table 1 (continued)
Best
D O 0 O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 SE DW Sample
Annual
BE G2(.02) -1.220 0.577 0.219 0.030 0.00056 0.01095 0.0126 1.16 1966-1992
(-3.79) ( 5.28) ( 3.61) ( 1.09) ( 1.43) ( 3.33)
DE U(.02) -2.061 0.634 0.372 0.062 0.00044 -0.00259 0.0079 2.03 1967-1992
(-9.05) ( 13.34) (10.34) ( 2.89) ( 1.61) (-1.13)
NO U(lin) -0.346 0.892 d 0.349 -0.71895 0.01262 0.0256 1.26 1966-1993
(-1.88) ( 11.56) ( 3.99) (-1.15) ( 2.07)
SW G1(lin) -1.878 0.619 a0.273 0.180 -0.31560 0.01097 0.0176 1.54 1966-1993
(-2.51) ( 5.38) ( 2.00) ( 6.64) (-1.75) ( 2.23)
GR G1(.02) -0.165 0.9310 0.046 0.220 0.00103 0.00143 0.0236 1.53 1964-1993
(-0.90) ( 19.32) ( 0.76) ( 3.98) ( 1.51) ( 0.26)
IR none -0.462 0.668 0.331 a0.093 − 0.00007 0.0258 1.67 1972-1991
(-1.58) ( 4.39) ( 1.80) ( 0.81) ( 0.01)
SP G1(.02) -0.832 0.739 0.233 a0.004 0.00099 -0.00690 0.0151 1.40 1964-1994
(-6.26) ( 19.83) (11.92) ( 0.17) ( 2.36) (-1.75)
NZ none -1.178 0.742 0.252 a0.147 − 0.00120 0.0290 1.48 1962-1992
(-4.59) ( 14.27) ( 3.21) ( 3.03) ( 0.21)
CO G1(lin) -3.131 0.527 c 0.098 -0.34885 0.10494 0.0195 2.37 1972-1994
(-3.33) ( 3.86) ( 2.41) (-1.89) ( 3.56)
JO none -0.070 0.947 c 0.212 − 0.00486 0.0386 1.82 1971-1995
(-0.40) ( 13.85) ( 4.12) ( 0.89)
SY none -0.549 0.851 c 0.011 − 0.02017 0.0748 1.38 1965-1994
(-1.43) ( 7.61) ( 0.16) ( 1.67)
PA none -0.257 0.805 c 0.170 − 0.01077 0.0215 1.57 1976-1993
(-0.67) ( 5.25) ( 2.37) ( 0.89)
PH none -0.128 0.924 c 0.213 − 0.00605 0.0542 1.53 1962-1993
(-0.45) ( 12.22) ( 4.60) ( 0.67)
TH G1(lin) -0.647 0.519 c 0.315 -0.17183 0.02169 0.0251 1.35 1962-1994
(-6.11) ( 7.57) ( 7.75) (-0.82) ( 6.33)
t-statistics are in parentheses.
aVariable lagged once. b taken to be 0. cNo wage data. dCoefficient taken to be 0.
 is not estimated for the annual countries.
U = unemployment rate, G1 = first output-gap variable, G2 = second output-gap variable.
The expression in parentheses following U, G1, and G2 is .02 if the nonlinear form is used and lin if the
linear form is used.
O 4 is expected to be negative when the linear form is used and positive when the nonlinear form is used.
CA=Canada, JA=Japan, AU=Austria, FR=France, GE=Germany, IT=Italy, NE=Netherlands, ST=Switzerland,
UK=United Kingdom, FI=Finland, AS=Australia, SO=South Africa, KO=Korea, BE=Belgium, DE=Denmark,
NO=Norway,SW=Sweden, GR=Greece, IR=Ireland, SP=Spain, NZ=New Zealand, CO=Colombia,
JO=Jordan,SY=Syria, PA=Pakistan, PH=Philippines, TH=Thailand
14The relative import price variable, st, does well in Table 1. All 27 coefficient
estimates are positive, and 19 estimates have t-statistics greater than 2.0. The wage
rate also does fairly well. Of the 17 estimates in Table 1, 12 have t-statistics greater
than or equal to 2.0.
The estimates of the final specification of the wage equation are presented in
Table 2. The coefficient restriction (4) was imposed for all these estimates. Of the
11 countries for which a demand pressure variable was used, the functional form was
linear for 7 of them. The chosen variable was the unemployment rate for 4 of the
11 and the second output-gap variable for the other 7. There is thus an edge for the
linearformandthesecondoutput-gapvariable. Thegoodshowingforthelinearform
furthershowsthedifficultyofestimatingnonlinearitiesbetweendemandpressureand
price and wage levels.
Tests of the Equations
A key question about the specification of the price and wage equations in (1) and (2)
is whether the true dynamics of the price and wage processes have been adequately
captured. To examine this, various lagged values of the variables in the equations
have been added to the equations and 2 tests of their joint significance performed.
The error terms have also been tested for fourth order serial correlation. The implicit
expectations mechanism has been tested by adding the led value of the wage rate
to the price equation and testing for its significance. This is one way of testing the
rational expectations hypothesis. The coefficient restriction in (4) has been tested.
Finally, a stability test of the coefficients has been performed. The results of these
15Table 2
Estimates of the Wage Equation
wt − t D γ0 C γ1.wt−1 − t−1/ C γ2pt C γ3pt−1 C γ4Dt C γ5t
Best
D O γ0 O γ1 O γ2 O γ4 O γ5 O  O γ3 SE DW
Quarterly
CA none 0.089 0.958 1.097 − -0.00002 b -1.050 0.0081 1.64
( 1.61) (34.06) (11.90) (-0.48)
JA none 0.431 0.903 1.031 − -0.00025 b -0.930 0.0107 1.99
( 2.46) (23.76) ( 9.67) (-1.70)
AU G2−1(lin) 2.084 0.680 0.392 a-0.15830 0.00039 -0.661 -0.112 0.0157 1.66
( 4.13) ( 8.96) ( 1.50) ( -2.61) ( 2.31) (-7.58)
FR none 0.575 0.924 1.348 − -0.00022 b -1.252 0.0092 1.61
( 1.80) (21.09) ( 4.46) (-1.97)
GE U−1(lin) 0.684 0.914 0.922 a-0.20253 0.00038 -0.312 -0.843 0.0119 2.16
( 2.69) (30.15) ( 3.27) ( -2.39) ( 2.11) (-3.12)
IT U−1(lin) 0.188 0.923 1.244 a-0.25124 -0.00026 b -1.157 0.0139 1.94
( 1.80) (22.81) ( 6.74) ( -1.42) (-0.91)
NE G2−1(.020) 1.638 0.596 -0.025 a0.00020 0.00147 0.412 0.269 0.0055 1.96
( 5.76) ( 9.06) (-0.25) ( 1.40) (10.23) (3.17)
UK G2−1(.020) 0.263 0.912 0.790 0.00050 -0.00007 b -0.697 0.0114 2.22
( 3.03) (29.51) ( 8.83) ( 2.44) (-1.02)
FI U−1(lin) 0.149 0.813 0.534 a-0.09613 -0.00015 -0.339 -0.361 0.0096 1.96
( 2.13) (10.06) ( 2.43) ( -2.52) (-1.10) (-2.37)
KO G2(.020) 0.272 0.952 0.267 0.00197 -0.00024 b -0.192 0.0283 2.19
( 3.15) (21.10) ( 3.20) ( 2.43) (-0.31)
Annual
DE U(lin) 0.461 0.911 1.353 -0.61265 0.00290 -1.268 0.0139 2.25
( 0.58) ( 6.29) ( 6.49) ( -3.45) ( 2.28)
SW G2(.020) 2.945 0.487 0.396 0.00162 0.00092 0.052 0.0224 2.03
( 3.51) ( 3.49) ( 2.21) ( 3.13) ( 0.48)
GR G2(lin) 0.261 0.953 0.912 -0.16925 0.00022 -0.867 0.0398 1.53
( 0.78) ( 9.96) ( 4.20) ( -1.70) ( 0.05)
IR none 0.192 0.968 0.521 − -0.00471 -0.489 0.0256 1.64
( 0.64) ( 5.32) ( 2.52) (-2.40)
SP G2(lin) 0.642 0.845 1.365 -0.14801 0.00281 -1.197 0.0198 2.14
( 3.64) (16.27) ( 8.37) ( -2.41) ( 1.46)
t-statistics are in parentheses.
b taken to be 0.
See the notes to Table 1.
O γ4 is expected to be negative when the linear form is used and positive when the nonlinear form is used.
The sample periods are the same as those in Table 1.
16tests are presented in Fair (1997b), and this discussion will not be repeated here.
The equations do fairly well in these tests. In particular, the extra lagged values
are generally not significant, which is fairly strong support of the dynamics. If the
equations had bad dynamics, one would expect the additional lagged values to be
significant.
A Digression on the NAIRU Specification
It is of interest to see how the price and wage equations (1) and (2) compare to the
NAIRU specification. Although there are many different versions of the NAIRU









where t is the rate of inflation (t D pt −pt−1, where p is the log of the price level),
ut is the actual value of the unemployment rate, u
t is the NAIRU, st is a supply shock
variable,andt istheerrorterm. Inthesimplestcasewherenis1andu
t isaconstant,
equation (5) is simply an equation with 1t on the left hand side and a constant, ut,
and st on the right hand side. In many cases, however, n is taken to be greater than 1,
and/or u
t is assumed to be something other than just a constant. Gordon (1997), for
example, takes n to be 24 and assumes that u
t is time varying. The NAIRU equation
in the influential book on European unemployment by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991), equation (48) on page 379, has n equal to 1 and no variable st, but it includes
both ut and ut−1 and it has u
t a function of unemployment benefits, union power,
and some tax rates.
17To see how (1) and (2) compare to (5), the wage variable needs to be substituted
out of (1). This is done by lagging (1) once, multiplying through by γ1, subtracting
this expression from (1), and then using (2) to substitute out the wage rate. This
yields:
pt D 1
1−2γ2[.0 C 2γ0 − 0γ1 C 5γ1/ C .1 C 2γ3 C γ1/pt−1
C3st − 3γ1st−1 C .4 C 2γ4/Dt − 4γ1Dt−1
C.5 − 5γ1 C 2γ5/t C .t − γ1t−1 C 2t/]
(6)
How does (6) compare to (5)? If in (6) D is taken to be u, then both (5) and (6)
include ut. In addition, (6) also includes ut−1, but this is probably a minor difference.
For example, as noted above, the NAIRU equation of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991) also includes ut−1. (6) includes st−1, which (5) does not, but this is perhaps
minor also. If u
t equals a constant term plus a coefficient times the time trend, then
(6) encompasses this specification because there is a constant term and time trend in
the equation.
The main difference between (5) and (6) concerns the dynamics. Since t D
pt − pt−1 and n is greater than 0, (5) has more lagged price levels in it than does
(6), but with the restriction that each price level is subtracted from the previous price
level and the restriction that the i’s sum to one. The restriction that each price
level is subtracted from the previous price level will be called the “first derivative”
restriction, and the restriction that the i’s sum to one will be called the “second
derivative” restriction.
The dynamics of (5) versus (6) can be tested by adding pt−1 and pt−2 to (5) and
seeing if they are jointly significant. Since (6) implies that these variables belong
18in the equation, they should be significant according to (6) but not according to (5).
Adding one of these variables breaks the second derivative restriction, and adding
both breaks both the first and second derivative restrictions. This test was performed
in Fair (1997a) for the United States and in Fair (1997b) for the other countries, and
the results strongly reject the dynamics implied by (5). pt−1 and pt−2 are generally
highly significant when added to various versions of (5). The NAIRU dynamics are
thus strongly rejected and in just the way that (6) suggests they should be.
4 The Experiment
The Setup
The experiment is a decrease in the German short-term interest rate between 1982:1
and 1990:4. To perform this experiment the interest rate reaction function of the
Bundesbank was dropped, and the German short-term interest rate was taken to be
exogenous. The reaction functions for all the other countries in the model were
retained, which means, for example, that the fall in the German rate directly affects
theinterestratesofthecountrieswhosereactionfunctionshavetheGermanrateasan
explanatoryvariable. TheGermaninterestratewasloweredby1percentagepointfor
1982:1-1983:4, by .75 percentage points for 1984:1-1985:4, by .5 percentage points
for 1986:1-1987:4, and by .25 percentage points for 1988:1-1990:4.
The first step is to add the estimated (historical) residuals to the model, both for
thestochasticequationsandforthetradeshareequations. Doingthisandthensolving
the model using the actual values of all the exogenous variables results in a perfect
tracking solution (i.e., the predicted values of the endogenous variables are equal to
19the actual values). Then the German interest rate is lowered and the model is solved.
The difference between the predicted value for each variable for each period from
thissolutionanditsactualvalueistheestimatedeffectofthemonetary-policychange
on the variable. Selected results of this experiment are presented in Table 3 for 17
countries, 15 European countries plus the United States and Japan.8The rest of this
section is a discussion of this table. Each fourth-quarter value is presented in Table
3 for the quarterly countries, while each annual value is presented for the annual
countries.
The units in Table 3 require some explanation. The column labeled ua gives the
actual value of the unemployment rate in percentage points, and the column labeled
a gives the actual value of the inflation rate (percentage change in the GDP price
index) in percentage points. These values are provided just for reference purposes.
The values in the remaining columns are either absolute or percentage changes from
the base values (remember that the base values are the actual values). Absolute
changes are given for the interest rate, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, and
the balance of payments as a fraction of GDP, while percentage changes are given
for the other variables. All the values are in percentage points. The notation for the
variables is given at the bottom of Table 3.
Qualitative Discussion
BeforelookingatthenumbersinTable3, itwillbeusefultoreviewqualitativelywhat
is likely to happen in the model in response to the decrease in the German interest
8The complete model is solved to yield these results, but to save space the results for the other
16 countries are not reported in Table 3.
20Table 3
Actual Changes from the Base Values after the German Interest Rate Decrease
ua a RS e Y u P  W PM PX IM EX S
GE 4 9.24 3.72 -1.00 1.47 0.37 -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.74 0.23 0.63 0.24 -0.30
8 9.96 2.97 -1.00 2.61 0.87 -0.21 0.26 0.21 0.34 1.20 0.52 1.06 0.63 -0.42
12 9.92 1.85 -0.75 3.14 1.26 -0.30 0.56 0.31 0.77 1.47 0.83 1.22 0.89 -0.43
16 9.90 2.47 -0.75 3.67 1.57 -0.35 0.90 0.34 1.24 1.78 1.17 1.42 1.09 -0.43
20 9.36 2.97 -0.50 3.81 1.79 -0.51 1.24 0.35 1.72 2.02 1.48 1.46 1.23 -0.35
24 9.51 1.40 -0.50 4.06 1.97 -0.69 1.57 0.33 2.26 2.32 1.80 1.50 1.29 -0.34
28 9.29 1.90 -0.25 3.96 2.01 -0.73 1.88 0.31 2.80 2.49 2.08 1.43 1.25 -0.36
32 8.53 2.82 -0.25 3.99 2.05 -0.75 2.14 0.27 3.23 2.77 2.34 1.30 1.12 -0.37
36 6.44 1.96 -0.25 4.07 2.14 -0.98 2.38 0.23 3.69 3.05 2.58 1.32 1.05 -0.39
FR 4 8.25 8.56 -0.43 1.46 0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.70 0.30 0.13 0.32 -0.07
8 8.50 10.42 -0.53 2.52 0.34 -0.14 0.10 0.09 0.14 1.07 0.53 0.47 0.66 -0.12
12 10.08 6.25 -0.44 2.90 0.50 -0.26 0.23 0.13 0.30 1.13 0.68 0.76 0.86 -0.13
16 10.26 5.94 -0.41 3.24 0.63 -0.39 0.38 0.16 0.50 1.31 0.83 1.00 1.04 -0.15
20 10.52 3.95 -0.29 3.19 0.69 -0.49 0.55 0.17 0.72 1.31 0.95 1.17 1.10 -0.13
24 10.37 3.29 -0.25 3.27 0.74 -0.56 0.72 0.18 0.94 1.50 1.11 1.21 1.10 -0.15
28 9.85 2.85 -0.12 3.03 0.73 -0.61 0.89 0.17 1.16 1.55 1.22 1.23 1.05 -0.17
32 9.15 3.46 -0.09 2.93 0.70 -0.63 1.04 0.16 1.36 1.65 1.36 1.13 0.93 -0.17
36 8.88 2.59 -0.08 2.91 0.67 -0.63 1.18 0.14 1.54 1.83 1.51 1.06 0.89 -0.18
IT 4 9.98 15.57 0.07 1.47 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.77 0.44 0.03 0.27 -0.04
8 11.01 14.06 0.12 2.62 0.10 -0.02 0.27 0.20 0.34 1.24 0.82 0.10 0.64 0.00
12 11.32 9.67 0.16 3.14 0.13 -0.03 0.47 0.22 0.60 1.44 1.08 0.16 0.87 0.03
16 12.03 7.88 0.19 3.65 0.16 -0.04 0.68 0.22 0.87 1.79 1.35 0.20 1.15 0.06
20 13.01 7.71 0.20 3.76 0.15 -0.04 0.88 0.21 1.12 1.95 1.54 0.23 1.23 0.07
24 13.63 6.36 0.22 3.96 0.15 -0.04 1.05 0.18 1.34 2.27 1.75 0.23 1.25 0.05
28 13.02 6.76 0.21 3.82 0.13 -0.04 1.20 0.15 1.51 2.43 1.88 0.21 1.23 0.03
32 12.66 6.30 0.20 3.78 0.11 -0.06 1.31 0.12 1.65 2.58 2.03 0.19 1.17 0.01
36 12.27 8.15 0.21 3.80 0.11 -0.06 1.43 0.12 1.79 2.81 2.18 0.16 1.15 -0.01
UK 4 12.32 7.00 -0.01 0.48 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.27 -0.09 0.04 0.12 0.09
8 12.58 4.47 -0.02 0.67 0.08 -0.04 -0.22 -0.17 -0.18 -0.79 -0.31 0.14 0.24 0.21
12 12.86 4.71 0.00 0.55 0.17 -0.09 -0.44 -0.23 -0.36 -1.21 -0.56 0.29 0.33 0.31
16 12.99 5.79 0.06 0.37 0.29 -0.17 -0.70 -0.28 -0.58 -1.61 -0.85 0.46 0.37 0.27
20 12.79 2.30 0.18 -0.01 0.39 -0.26 -0.92 -0.22 -0.73 -1.76 -1.10 0.58 0.32 0.18
24 10.26 5.70 0.31 -0.42 0.45 -0.34 -1.10 -0.19 -0.76 -2.10 -1.33 0.64 0.23 0.18
28 8.26 7.31 0.41 -0.98 0.43 -0.39 -1.09 0.01 -0.30 -2.38 -1.43 0.61 0.00 0.23
32 6.83 6.85 0.44 -1.43 0.36 -0.38 -0.91 0.20 0.07 -2.65 -1.39 0.53 -0.24 0.36
36 7.56 5.28 0.39 -1.75 0.28 -0.32 -0.84 0.07 0.01 -2.82 -1.39 0.42 -0.55 0.35
US 4 10.68 5.25 -0.01 - 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.41 -0.08 0.09 -0.06 0.02
8 8.54 3.86 -0.01 - 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.77 -0.18 0.28 -0.16 0.03
12 7.28 3.52 0.00 - 0.08 -0.03 -0.19 -0.08 -0.15 -0.98 -0.27 0.50 -0.20 0.02
16 7.05 3.45 0.02 - 0.09 -0.03 -0.25 -0.07 -0.21 -1.08 -0.34 0.69 -0.21 0.01
20 6.84 2.52 0.05 - 0.09 -0.03 -0.29 -0.04 -0.25 -0.98 -0.37 0.78 -0.10 -0.01
24 5.87 3.24 0.06 - 0.09 -0.02 -0.32 -0.02 -0.27 -0.89 -0.39 0.80 -0.04 -0.02
28 5.35 3.98 0.08 - 0.08 -0.01 -0.31 0.00 -0.28 -0.70 -0.37 0.75 0.00 -0.03
32 5.37 3.93 0.09 - 0.06 -0.01 -0.29 0.03 -0.27 -0.51 -0.33 0.65 0.02 -0.04
36 6.11 4.66 0.10 - 0.05 0.01 -0.26 0.03 -0.24 -0.34 -0.29 0.53 0.04 -0.04
JA 4 2.46 0.80 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 -0.38 0.01 0.02 -0.04
8 2.66 2.25 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.34 -0.69 0.03 0.07 -0.06
12 2.72 3.12 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.47 -0.81 0.05 0.13 -0.06
16 2.74 1.61 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.57 -0.91 0.07 0.22 -0.05
20 2.80 1.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.58 -0.84 0.09 0.22 -0.03
24 2.71 0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.46 -0.77 0.07 0.19 -0.03
28 2.43 1.10 0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 -0.26 -0.60 0.04 0.16 -0.03
32 2.25 2.71 0.05 0.26 -0.06 0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.43 -0.01 0.13 -0.04
36 2.10 1.94 0.05 0.34 -0.09 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 0.15 -0.30 -0.07 0.11 -0.04
aActual values.
Absolute changes for , RS, S, and u; percentage changes for the rest. All values are in percentage points.
e = exchange rate, EX = real value of exports, IM = real value of imports, P = GDP price index,  = percentage change in P,
PM= import price index, PX= export price index, RS = short-term interest rate, S = balance of payments as a percent of
nominal GDP, u = unemployment rate, W = wage rate, Y = real GDP.
GE=Germany, FR=France, IT=Italy, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States, JA=Japan, AU=Austria, NE=Netherlands,
ST=Switzerland, FI=Finland, BE=Belgium, DE=Denmark, NO=Norway, SW=Sweden, GR=Greece, IR=Ireland, SP=Spain.
21Table 3 (continued)
Actual Changes from the Base Values after the German Interest Rate Decrease
ua a RS e Y u P  W PM PX IM EX S
AU 4 4.19 4.74 -0.45 1.47 0.32 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.42 0.04 0.27 0.43 -0.10
8 3.85 3.81 -0.58 2.61 0.83 -0.26 0.22 0.18 0.36 0.77 0.22 0.92 0.91 -0.26
12 3.76 4.09 -0.50 3.13 1.23 -0.48 0.46 0.25 0.77 1.01 0.46 1.47 1.21 -0.38
16 3.71 3.36 -0.48 3.64 1.55 -0.70 0.76 0.31 1.20 1.35 0.76 1.88 1.46 -0.47
20 3.47 4.50 -0.36 3.77 1.75 -0.90 1.03 0.28 1.59 1.65 1.03 2.22 1.67 -0.43
24 3.58 1.18 -0.33 3.99 1.87 -1.07 1.28 0.25 1.90 1.98 1.28 2.42 1.83 -0.51
28 3.71 2.10 -0.21 3.88 1.87 -1.20 1.61 0.32 2.22 2.17 1.61 2.34 1.74 -0.46
32 3.44 2.92 -0.17 3.89 1.74 -1.27 1.97 0.36 2.51 2.47 1.97 2.25 1.59 -0.54
36 3.34 3.80 -0.16 3.99 1.59 -1.29 2.44 0.49 2.87 2.71 2.45 2.11 1.45 -0.45
NE 4 - 2.24 -0.68 1.36 0.15 - 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.70 0.38 0.57 0.44 -0.28
8 - 1.28 -0.62 2.40 0.30 - 0.19 0.11 0.08 1.08 0.67 1.19 0.95 -0.40
12 - 2.13 -0.34 2.82 0.50 - 0.27 0.08 0.15 1.23 0.81 1.47 1.28 -0.37
16 - 2.34 -0.23 3.18 0.74 - 0.34 0.07 0.20 1.45 0.93 1.61 1.61 -0.31
20 - -2.77 0.05 3.14 1.00 - 0.37 0.03 0.25 1.44 0.96 1.42 1.70 -0.17
24 - 2.09 0.09 3.17 1.09 - 0.41 0.04 0.28 1.56 1.03 1.37 1.83 -0.12
28 - 0.88 0.30 2.88 1.16 - 0.42 0.02 0.30 1.56 1.01 1.17 1.77 -0.09
32 - 1.31 0.33 2.68 1.22 - 0.44 0.02 0.34 1.58 1.03 0.97 1.74 -0.04
36 - 3.05 0.36 2.55 1.31 - 0.47 0.03 0.43 1.61 1.07 0.88 1.85 0.13
ST 4 0.73 6.18 0.02 1.07 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.02 - 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.04
8 1.00 2.12 0.06 1.82 0.18 -0.10 0.08 0.06 - 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.61 0.11
12 1.14 2.77 0.11 2.09 0.26 -0.14 0.18 0.10 - 0.12 0.32 0.41 0.84 0.20
16 0.91 3.78 0.18 2.34 0.34 -0.19 0.31 0.14 - 0.16 0.43 0.47 0.98 0.26
20 0.74 3.51 0.24 2.29 0.39 -0.21 0.48 0.17 - 0.36 0.56 0.42 1.05 0.26
24 0.67 1.96 0.29 2.34 0.45 -0.22 0.65 0.18 - 0.48 0.72 0.32 1.01 0.29
28 0.55 3.38 0.34 2.14 0.50 -0.23 0.84 0.20 - 0.60 0.87 0.17 0.93 0.31
32 0.45 4.23 0.39 2.05 0.56 -0.29 1.05 0.21 - 0.82 1.06 0.00 0.83 0.31
36 0.75 5.89 0.43 2.03 0.59 -0.38 1.26 0.23 - 0.88 1.25 -0.20 0.72 0.37
FI 4 7.00 8.18 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.63 -0.20 0.03 0.00 0.14
8 7.04 8.78 -0.01 0.57 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.01 -0.31 0.10 0.06 0.22
12 6.88 8.45 -0.01 0.85 0.14 -0.06 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12 -1.08 -0.30 0.20 0.21 0.25
16 6.82 4.36 0.00 1.08 0.23 -0.12 -0.13 0.04 -0.09 -0.93 -0.25 0.30 0.31 0.21
20 6.72 5.25 0.01 1.24 0.33 -0.17 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.80 -0.11 0.43 0.38 0.18
24 6.66 4.99 0.03 1.36 0.41 -0.22 0.11 0.16 0.13 -0.53 0.05 0.56 0.49 0.16
28 5.75 7.50 0.05 1.47 0.46 -0.24 0.37 0.28 0.34 -0.15 0.34 0.54 0.43 0.12
32 4.51 6.19 0.07 1.71 0.45 -0.31 1.09 0.76 0.87 0.38 0.96 0.52 0.33 0.15
36 5.36 4.78 0.09 2.16 0.46 -0.35 1.78 0.72 1.49 1.07 1.63 0.48 0.13 0.09
BE 1 14.46 7.07 -0.42 0.96 0.26 -0.07 0.03 0.03 - 0.36 0.33 -0.03 0.21 0.13
2 15.72 5.57 -0.58 2.21 0.74 -0.20 0.08 0.05 - 0.83 0.76 -0.09 0.57 0.38
3 15.71 5.20 -0.53 2.90 1.22 -0.36 0.14 0.06 - 1.13 1.04 -0.13 0.85 0.59
4 14.79 6.08 -0.50 3.33 1.68 -0.52 0.18 0.04 - 1.33 1.21 -0.13 1.09 0.71
5 14.13 3.81 -0.38 3.51 2.10 -0.66 0.21 0.04 - 1.60 1.34 -0.13 1.23 0.60
6 13.84 2.33 -0.33 3.59 2.44 -0.75 0.24 0.03 - 1.76 1.44 -0.11 1.31 0.56
7 12.79 1.76 -0.20 3.47 2.56 -0.80 0.30 0.06 - 1.88 1.51 -0.10 1.27 0.47
8 11.69 4.80 -0.15 3.29 2.64 -1.04 0.35 0.06 - 1.98 1.56 -0.08 1.21 0.41
9 11.08 3.01 -0.13 3.19 2.66 -1.31 0.40 0.05 - 2.08 1.64 -0.08 1.17 0.26
DE 1 12.21 10.56 -0.33 0.98 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.01 0.20 0.02
2 12.70 7.64 -0.50 2.25 0.20 -0.10 0.23 0.18 0.39 0.79 0.61 0.05 0.53 0.09
3 9.78 5.65 -0.51 3.02 0.31 -0.20 0.57 0.36 0.96 1.17 1.01 0.11 0.81 0.16
4 8.49 4.33 -0.51 3.63 0.38 -0.28 1.13 0.58 1.85 1.54 1.52 0.19 1.01 0.26
5 6.68 4.55 -0.42 4.19 0.38 -0.33 2.00 0.90 3.18 2.13 2.25 0.26 1.06 0.26
6 6.65 4.71 -0.38 4.89 0.35 -0.33 3.18 1.21 4.89 2.89 3.27 0.31 0.98 0.28
7 7.80 3.39 -0.28 5.66 0.28 -0.30 4.67 1.50 6.98 3.91 4.54 0.32 0.76 0.26
8 9.49 4.22 -0.22 6.68 0.16 -0.22 6.49 1.81 9.42 5.20 6.13 0.33 0.49 0.24
9 9.52 2.69 -0.20 8.12 0.01 -0.11 8.67 2.10 12.24 6.86 8.08 0.31 0.13 0.08Table 3 (continued)
Actual Changes from the Base Values after the German Interest Rate Decrease
ua a RS e Y u P  W PM PX IM EX S
NO 1 4.33 10.19 0.01 0.97 0.09 -0.04 0.16 0.17 - 0.36 0.16 0.02 0.24 0.01
2 5.26 6.10 0.02 2.25 0.24 -0.13 0.45 0.31 - 0.79 0.45 0.05 0.60 0.11
3 4.74 6.40 0.05 3.01 0.37 -0.22 0.81 0.38 - 1.17 0.81 0.11 0.90 0.22
4 4.12 5.00 0.09 3.54 0.47 -0.31 1.19 0.39 - 1.49 1.19 0.17 1.12 0.31
5 3.58 -1.42 0.13 3.85 0.49 -0.37 1.56 0.37 - 1.87 1.56 0.23 1.21 0.22
6 3.79 7.16 0.17 4.09 0.49 -0.40 1.89 0.35 - 2.15 1.89 0.29 1.25 0.19
7 4.84 4.41 0.20 4.14 0.47 -0.41 2.20 0.32 - 2.52 2.20 0.31 1.14 0.11
8 6.61 6.31 0.23 4.15 0.48 -0.42 2.49 0.30 - 2.84 2.49 0.32 1.08 0.12
9 7.13 4.20 0.24 4.24 0.46 -0.42 2.77 0.28 - 3.18 2.77 0.33 0.99 0.06
SW 1 3.14 8.25 -0.14 0.99 0.04 - 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.09 0.04 0.20 -0.08
2 3.45 10.07 -0.22 2.27 0.12 - 0.26 0.19 0.14 0.99 0.26 0.13 0.56 -0.14
3 3.08 7.58 -0.22 2.99 0.21 - 0.46 0.21 0.30 1.35 0.46 0.24 0.91 -0.11
4 2.80 6.63 -0.18 3.44 0.28 - 0.67 0.22 0.49 1.65 0.67 0.34 1.21 -0.10
5 2.97 6.86 -0.10 3.63 0.34 - 0.86 0.20 0.68 1.82 0.86 0.43 1.39 -0.03
6 2.23 4.76 -0.01 3.72 0.38 - 1.04 0.19 0.88 1.99 1.04 0.48 1.49 -0.02
7 1.94 6.48 0.09 3.61 0.39 - 1.21 0.17 1.07 2.13 1.21 0.51 1.52 -0.02
8 1.68 8.03 0.18 3.46 0.39 - 1.35 0.16 1.23 2.27 1.35 0.51 1.50 -0.05
9 1.98 8.84 0.25 3.41 0.40 - 1.51 0.17 1.37 2.52 1.51 0.51 1.50 -0.07
GR 1 5.78 25.10 - 0.99 0.01 - 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.48 0.49 0.01 0.16 -0.01
2 7.86 19.12 - 2.29 0.03 - 0.35 0.28 0.32 1.15 1.13 0.03 0.38 -0.04
3 8.14 20.28 - 3.06 0.06 - 0.63 0.34 0.60 1.61 1.59 0.05 0.52 -0.02
4 7.81 17.67 - 3.58 0.09 - 0.92 0.34 0.87 1.92 1.92 0.08 0.63 -0.04
5 7.38 17.52 - 3.85 0.12 - 1.18 0.30 1.13 2.08 2.19 0.10 0.70 -0.02
6 7.36 14.26 - 4.02 0.14 - 1.41 0.27 1.37 2.28 2.43 0.11 0.63 -0.01
7 7.67 15.59 - 3.99 0.14 - 1.64 0.26 1.59 2.46 2.60 0.09 0.42 -0.05
8 7.46 14.49 - 3.91 0.14 - 1.84 0.23 1.81 2.55 2.75 0.11 0.49 -0.05
9 7.03 20.83 - 3.92 0.15 - 2.04 0.23 2.01 2.81 2.96 0.11 0.47 -0.09
IR 1 12.72 15.18 0.02 0.96 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.27 0.00 0.25 -0.07
2 15.24 10.71 0.03 2.21 0.26 -0.09 0.06 0.06 0.03 1.18 0.65 0.08 0.64 -0.10
3 16.78 6.38 0.03 2.93 0.48 -0.19 0.18 0.13 0.09 1.60 0.94 0.24 1.01 -0.08
4 18.91 5.19 0.02 3.40 0.67 -0.32 0.32 0.15 0.17 1.89 1.16 0.42 1.32 -0.06
5 18.53 5.75 0.02 3.65 0.82 -0.46 0.45 0.14 0.24 2.17 1.36 0.56 1.54 -0.06
6 18.77 2.20 0.04 3.81 0.93 -0.58 0.58 0.13 0.32 2.52 1.54 0.66 1.64 -0.14
7 17.89 3.39 0.06 3.78 1.00 -0.68 0.71 0.13 0.39 2.77 1.69 0.73 1.68 -0.23
8 16.90 5.44 0.10 3.70 1.02 -0.76 0.83 0.13 0.46 3.02 1.83 0.74 1.67 -0.35
9 14.68 -0.78 0.15 3.70 1.00 -0.82 0.94 0.11 0.54 3.33 1.99 0.71 1.60 -0.52
SP 1 19.56 13.93 0.00 0.96 0.06 - 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.27 -0.14 0.16 0.00
2 20.85 11.76 -0.01 2.20 0.17 - 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.19 0.61 -0.34 0.40 0.03
3 23.41 11.62 0.00 2.88 0.28 - 0.08 0.06 0.18 1.45 0.84 -0.45 0.63 0.13
4 24.58 7.69 0.00 3.30 0.38 - 0.16 0.08 0.33 1.65 1.01 -0.49 0.82 0.18
5 23.91 11.07 0.01 3.49 0.46 - 0.27 0.12 0.52 1.79 1.15 -0.48 0.95 0.17
6 22.97 5.85 0.02 3.59 0.52 - 0.43 0.17 0.79 1.91 1.32 -0.45 1.01 0.16
7 21.81 5.65 0.03 3.51 0.55 - 0.68 0.26 1.16 2.07 1.50 -0.38 1.05 0.13
8 19.56 7.09 0.04 3.42 0.54 - 1.09 0.43 1.74 2.18 1.77 -0.24 1.05 0.11
9 18.34 7.31 0.05 3.48 0.48 - 1.72 0.67 2.59 2.40 2.20 -0.05 1.01 0.09
23rate. Consider first the effects of an interest rate decrease in a particular country.
A decrease in the short-term rate in a country leads to a decrease in the long-term
rate through the term structure equation. A decrease in the short-term rate also leads
to a depreciation of the country’s currency (assuming that the interest rate decrease
is relative to other countries’ interest rates). The interest rate decreases lead to an
increase in consumption, investment, and imports. The depreciation of the currency
leads to an increase in exports. This effect on exports works through the trade-share
equations. The dollar price of the country’s exports that feeds into the trade-share
equations is lower because of the depreciation, and this increases the share of the
other countries’ total imports imported from the particular country. The effect on
aggregate demand in the country from the interest rate decrease is thus positive from
the increase in consumption, investment, and exports and negative from the increase
in imports. The net effect could thus go either way, but it is almost always positive.
Thereisalsoapositiveeffectoninflation. Thedepreciationleadstoanincreasein
the price of imports, and this has a positive effect on the domestic price level through
the price equation. In addition, if aggregate demand increases, this increases demand
pressure, which has a positive effect on the domestic price level.
There are many other effects that follow from these, including effects back on the
short-term interest rate itself through the interest rate reaction function, but these are
typically second order in nature, especially in the short run. The main effects are as
just described.
The decrease in the German interest rate should thus stimulate the German econ-
omy, depreciate the mark, and lead to a rise in German prices and wages. How much
24prices and wages rise depends, among other things, on the size of the coefficient
estimates of the demand pressure variables in the price and wage equations and on
the functional forms of the demand pressure variables. The size of the wage and
price increases also depends on how much the mark depreciates and on the size of
the coefficient estimate of the import price variable in the price equation.
For those European countries whose interest rate reaction functions include the
German interest rate as an explanatory variable, the fall in the German rate will lead
to a direct fall in their interest rates. In addition, the depreciation of the mark (relative
to the dollar) will lead to a depreciation of the other European countries’ currencies
(relative to the dollar) because they are fairly closely tied to the mark in the short run
through the exchange rate equations.
The Results
Turn now to the results in Table 3. By the end of the nine-year period the German
exchange rate relative to the dollar (e) had depreciated 4.07 percent, the price level
(P) was 2.14 percent higher, the inflation rate () was .23 percentage points higher,
and the unemployment rate (u) was .98 percentage points lower—all compared to
the base case (the actual values). (An increase in e for a country is a depreciation of
the country’s currency relative to the dollar.) The balance of payments as a percent
of GDP (S) was .39 percentage points lower: German imports (IM) rose more than
German exports (EX), and German import prices (PM) rose more than German
export prices (PX).
The interest rate (RS) for France fell because French monetary policy is affected
25by German monetary policy. (The German interest rate is an explanatory variable
in the French interest rate reaction function.) By the end of the period the French
exchange rate had depreciated 2.91 percent, the price level was 1.18 percent higher,
the inflation rate was .14 percentage points higher, and the unemployment rate was
.63 percentage points lower. Note that although both the mark and the French franc
depreciated relative to the dollar (4.07 and 2.91 percent, respectively), the franc de-
preciatedlessandthusappreciatedrelativetothemark. Thisisbecauseofthesmaller
rise in the domestic price level in France than in Germany.
The Italian lira is closely tied to the mark in the model, and the lira depreciated
almost as much as the mark. This led to a rise in the Italian price level, which led
the Italian monetary authorities to raise the interest rate. This offset much of the
stimulus from the depreciation. By the end of the period the price level was 1.43
percent higher, the inflation rate .12 percentage points higher, and the unemployment
rate .06 percentage points lower.
The UK results are a little more complicated to explain. The pound initially
depreciated relative to the dollar, but by less than did the mark. The pound thus
appreciatedrelativetothemark(andotherEuropeancurrencies),andthisappreciation
was large enough to lead to a decrease in the overall UK import price index. This
in turn had a negative effect on the UK domestic price level. The UK was thus in
the envious position of having a lower price level and a lower unemployment rate.
UK export prices (PX) fell less than did UK import prices (PM), and this is the
main reason for the increase in the UK balance of payments (S). The increase in
the UK balance of payments is an increase in net UK foreign security and reserve
26holdings, and this increase has a positive effect on consumption. This positive effect
on consumption is the main reason for the increase in UK output. By the end of the
period the UK price level is 0.84 percent lower, the inflation rate is .07 percentage
points higher, and the unemployment rate is .32 percentage points lower.
The main effect on the US was a fall in the price of imports, caused by the
appreciation of the dollar relative to the European currencies. This led to a slight fall
in the US domestic price level and to an increase in US imports. The net effect on
US output was small. Similarly, the Japanese price of imports fell, and there was a
slight fall in the Japanese domestic price level.
Theresultsfortheremaining11EuropeancountriesinTable3shouldbefairlyself
explanatory. Thecurrenciesdepreciatedrelativetothedollarbecausetheyareclosely
tied to the mark, and these depreciations stimulated the economies. In addition, the
interest rate in a number of countries fell in response to the fall in the German interest
rate, and this was stimulative. Therefore, both prices and output rose in the countries.
Denmark is an outlier in the size of its exchange rate response, which suggests that
the Denmark exchange rate equation may not be well specified.
275 Conclusion
The following table helps bring together some of the main results in Table 3:
Changes from the Base Values after 36 Quarters
Price Inflation Unempl. Output
Level Rate Rate
GE 2.38 .23 -.98 2.14
FR 1.18 .14 -.63 .67
IT 1.43 .12 -.06 .11
UK -.84 .07 -.32 .28
Are these estimated price level and inflation costs worth incurring for the result-
ing gains in output and decreases in unemployment? The answer to this depends,
of course, on one’s welfare function, but it seems likely, given the fairly small esti-
mated costs, that many welfare functions would call for accepting the costs. In other
words, many people are likely to agree that the Bundesbank should have been more
expansionary in the 1980s based on these estimated price level and inflation costs.
Remember that these results are not governed by the NAIRU dynamics. It is not the
case that an experiment like this will result in accelerating price levels, so there are
no horrible events lurking beyond the 36-quarter horizon of the present experiment.
Whether one accepts this conclusion depends, of course, on whether one thinks
the price and wage equations underlying it are any good. The tests in Fair (1997a,
1997b) strongly support the equations’ dynamics and reject the NAIRU dynamics,
and so I would argue that the current results should be taken seriously.
The results of estimating the price and wage equations do not, however, pin down
28thepointatwhichtherelationshipbetweenthepricelevelandunemploymentbecomes
highly nonlinear. Although the best fitting functional forms of the demand pressure
variables were used for the results in Table 3, other functional forms usually gave
similar fits. As mentioned in the Introduction, this is not a problem for the present
paper because the experiment is over a period in which unemployment was generally
quite high, but it does mean that the MC model should not be pushed into values of
the unemployment rate much lower than have been observed historically.
The main message for policy makers from the estimates of the price and wage
equations and the tests of the NAIRU dynamics is that policy makers should not think
there is some value of the unemployment rate below which the price level accelerates
and above which it decelerates. They should think instead that the price level is
a negative function of the unemployment rate (or other measure of demand slack),
where at some point the function begins to become highly nonlinear. How bold a
policy maker is in pushing the unemployment rate into uncharted waters will depend
on how fast he or she thinks the nonlinearity becomes severe. The results in Table 3
suggest that more pushing could have been done in Europe in the 1980s with fairly
modest price level costs.
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